ook
programmes to stimulate the development of small and medium business.
Millions of small companies sprang up in the areas of services, tourism,
trade, electrical goods and a number of other branches of the economy. By
some accounts these small enterprises account for up to half the working
population of Western European countries.
At the same time the large family properties in Western Europe and the
USA have lost the position of monopoly and importance which they had at the
beginning of the century. Today neither Rothschild, nor Dupont, neither
Morgan nor Rockerfeller can exert direct influence on questions of national
importance as they could have done a hundred years ago. This has allowed
Western European societies to halt their deterioration and to stop the
growth of class contradictions and gradually to wipe out the gap between the
different social groups. Thirty years after the end of the Second World War
the nature of employed labour had changed beyond recognition and the
proletariate described by Marx dissolved within a entirely new social and
technological environment. If now at the end of the 20th century one is to
visit the factories of, for example, Zussler near Zurich or American
Standard New York, one will see a completely new type of work force with
different interests and a different mentality and, more importantly, a
workforce which is integrated within the decision making processes. These
are no longer the same workers which lead Karl Marx to write "Capital" and
who gave rise to mass political and trade union protests at the beginning of
the 20th century.
In the post-war period and particularly in the 1970's and 1980's a
process of change in the nature of property ownership began which continues
to the present. This in its turn has had direct ramifications upon the
nature of power. This revolution has allowed the USA, Japan and another
twenty or so countries to adapt much more quickly and effectively to the
needs of the modern scientific and technological revolution and to become
global leaders.
At the same time the development of the USSR and Eastern Europe has
been halted as a result of the totalitarian nature of their regimes. It is
true that when it was formed in 1922, the Soviet Union inherited a poorly
developed industrial base and a poorly educated population but it is also
true that the totalitarian regime established by Stalin at the end of the
1920's had destructive and devastating consequences upon all areas of life.
Tens of million of people lost their lives as a result of violence and
repression - this was as a dramatic feature of the Stalinist regime as the
complete repression of free creativity and private initiative.
Centralisation in the decision making process could only provide temporary
benefits in military and defence issues but in all other cases it halted
intellectual, technical and economic development. From the very outset
Stalinism contained within itself the thesis of forced, coercive growth. The
initial results did not hide the truth that, given time, coercive
development was to become transformed into stagnation and regression. The
destruction of private enterprise, the total and coercive collectivisation
of agriculture in December 1922, the substitution of market forces with
party and subjective criteria and the repression of the intelligentsia could
not do anything but leave a profound scar and cause serious consequences for
human development.
During the period between 1950 and 1960 total nationalisation could
still be explained using complex and serious internal reasons, the general
radicalisation of European regimes (especially in the 1930's) and the
necessity to achieve military parity. However, during subsequent decades the
totalitarian regimes became totally bankrupt. Many people in Eastern Europe
still believe that the collapse in the Eastern European systems was due to
the mistakes made by Mikhail Gorbachev and his programmes of "perestroika".
I, personally, believe that the historical role of Gorbachev was a direct
result of the overall negative trends in the development of Eastern Europe
and the universal economic and political crisis which had gripped this part
of the world.
This crisis above all manifested itself in terms of the dramatic
technological backwardness which began to become apparent as early as the
late 1960's and became most marked during the 1980's. Eastern Europe began
to lag behind in electronics, bio-technology, communications, environmental
facilities and many other fields. Because all these technological fields are
so closely linked Eastern Europe began to fall behind in every other
possible field from the production of nails to complex aviation technology.
The technological advantages of the West affected daily life, the workplace
and management. The rate at which the East began to fall behind in the
1980's was so dramatic that certain experts began to speak of a possible
"global technological gorge" opening up between the East and the West, or in
other words a "self-perpetuating backwardness".
With the appearance of micro-electronics, new communications and space
technology, the Soviet military, who had up until now played a key role in
the political life of the totalitarian state, began to realise more and more
clearly that their economic backwardness would sooner or later affect their
military and strategic position. This was also understood by those
politicians with greater awareness unencumbered by political dogma. Although
the USSR had achieved nuclear parity and, in certain areas, superiority,
with the USA, its backwardness in the field of micro-electronics and
communications at the beginning of the 1980's began to change this trend.
The enormous amounts of money expended on military causes undermined the
Soviet economy and doomed it to universal inefficiency.
In a comparison of figures, it can be seen that while in 1960 the GNP
of the USSR was only about $5000 USD less than in the USA, in 1980 this
difference had reached $10,000 and in 1990 - $20,000. In 1960 the
manufacturing output of the USSR was $1000 per head of population more than
in Japan. Only 20 years later Japan was producing goods to the value of
$11,864 per head of population in comparison with $6,863 in the USSR. At the
beginning of the 1990's the gap had widened to $30,000.[16]
A similar process was taking place in comparable smaller European
countries. The German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland
and Bulgaria were experiencing growing difficulties reflected in the drastic
increases in their external debt in the 1980's. Without the need for further
statistics, I believe, that the most obvious example was the difference
between the type of automobiles produced in East and West Germany. Whether
we compare Wartburgs with Mercedes or Trabants with Volkswagens it is quite
clear that we are dealing with two distinct generations of manufacturing
cultures. My example is based on motor vehicles since they reflect the
general level of industry as a whole: metallurgy, chemical production, heavy
machinery construction, electronics, textiles and so on.. While industry in
Western Europe was already using a new generation of production technology,
Eastern Europe was still dominated by a generation of production machinery
which was physically and morally at least twenty five years out of date.
The majority of Eastern Europeans lived in the conditions of
information deprivation. They were fed propaganda of constant progress and
achievement, the collapse of world capitalism and the greater and greater
victories of world socialism. In actual fact the reality was exactly the
opposite. Of course, many progressive leaders in Eastern Europe during this
period were aware of the problems but none of them were able to release
themselves from the common bonds of Eastern European imperialism. This was
made clear by the fate of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the Prague
Spring of 1968, as well as the unrest amongst the Polish workers and the
timid attempts at reform made in Bulgaria in 1986[17]. It was
quite clear that changes could only take place in the context of global
reforms affecting the USSR as well.
The negative consequences of technological backwardness were
exacerbated by the changes in the world economic situation in the mid
1980's. The collapse in the prices of oil and a number of other raw
materials lead to a sharp decline in the ability of the USSR and its allies
to function efficiently and to improve the standards of living of its
peoples. In the 1980's the member countries of COMECON experienced their
greatest difficulties in foreign trade and were obliged to increase their
external debts. From the mid 1980's the Soviet Union and its allies lost
their most important comparative economic advantages and were obliged to
cover their current account deficits with large external loans which even
then came to more than 100 billion dollars.
The nature of the technological changes of the 1970's and 1980's also
raised doubts about economic centralisation. In the 1930's and after the
Second World War technological innovation relied heavily on the centralised
accumulation and management of funds. Energy production, nuclear technology
and chemical production, large irrigation projects, heavy industry and arms
production were very strong arguments in favour of the need for centralised
planning and the active participation of the state in the economy.
On the other hand the technological wave of the 1970's pre-supposed the
decentralisation of the decision making process. The production of software
and personal computer applications, the appearance of tens of thousands of
different types of services and the progress in bio-technology stimulated
and continue to stimulate individual creativity. This was in contradiction
to the very essence of the Soviet type of system.
Consequently the backwardness of Eastern Europe in the 1970's and
1980's was not only a consequence of political and economic conjuncture but
had a long-term and objective character. It was connected with the inherent
backwardness not only of individual areas of manufacturing but of the
primary governmental and economic structures. As a result of the influence
of new technologies on the life of societies, the crisis soon spread to the
personal lives of the individual Eastern Europeans. In the 1970's and 1980's
personal consumption per head of population in Eastern Europe began
progressively to fall behind the average consumption figures for Western
Europe, the USA and Japan.
According to UN statistics for 1960, for every 1000 West Germans there
were 78 motor vehicles in comparison with 20 in Czechoslovakia and 17 in the
German Democratic Republic. In 1985 this figure had risen to 400 in West
Germany in comparison to 180 in East Germany and 163 in Czechoslovakia. In
1960 in the USSR there were 1.6 telephones per hundred people and in Japan -
5.8. In 1984 this figure was 9.8 for the USSR and 53.5 in
Japan[18].
In the late 1960's the economic backwardness of the USSR and its allies
began to spread to non-manufacturing environments. In 1960 infant mortality
per 1000 newly born infants was 26 in the USA, 31 in Japan and 35 in the
USSR. In 1985 this figure had changed to 10.4 per thousand in the USA, 5.7
in Japan and 25.1 in the USSR. Similar comparisons can be made in the area
of science, education, culture and cultural life in general. It would, of
course, be naive and imprudent to ignore the successes which the USSR and
its allies achieved in the area of space research, physics, chemistry and
molecular biology and in certain other areas of technology. These were,
however, rather oases within the overall system rather than its essential
features. They did not change the overall picture of backwardness or its
deepening character.
Clearly, against a background of increasing internationalisation and
more and more intensive exchange of information, the backwardness of Eastern
Europe began to become transformed into a universal moral and political
crisis. In the context of the boom of world communications, radio and
television, satellite communications and information transfer, the truth
could not be hidden for long. The attempts of the USSR and the other Eastern
European countries to propagate lies reached absurd extents to prove that
they were at the head of technological and economic progress. For more and
more people in Eastern Europe it was becoming clear that the backwardness of
their countries in manufacturing and consumerism was a direct result of the
vices of the system itself.
It should be noted, on the other hand, that right up until their demise
the Eastern European regimes retained certain benefits such as full
employment, a low crime rate, universal social guarantees and a number of
other features. The price of these benefits from the 1960's onwards,
however, had begun to manifest itself in the form of empty shops, the lack
of basic products, the low standard of living and the lack of personal
freedom etc.. Given such a situation, it was more and more difficult to
speak of the successes of the Soviet style system against the background not
only of a worsening economic situation but also of the moral and political
climate. The Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, the uprisings and protests of
the Polish workers, the reforms in Hungary, the dissident movement in the
USSR, the mass movement in favour of emigration to the West was a
manifestation of the growing level of dissatisfaction or unhappiness with
the existing system.
In the 1970's the USA and its Western allies managed to impose a new
leading ideology: the issue of human rights and the rights and freedoms of
all citizens of the world. A number of "capitalist" countries such as
Sweden, Austria and others guaranteed more social benefits, including
pensions, unemployment benefit for young persons etc.. In general, in the
USA, Japan, Western Europe and a number of other smaller countries with a
market economy, life become more attractive and more in tune with the
growing diversity and increase in human needs. In contrast with this in
Eastern Europe and the USSR, there was a sharp increase in crime,
drunkenness, apathy and scepticism.
This lead to major geo-political consequences. After the collapse of
the colonial model, the Soviet Union, despite its concentrated efforts, was
unable to impose its system on the newly liberated countries. The majority
of them adopted systems and models closer to those of Western countries.
Attempts at "socialist revolutions" in Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Ghana,
Somalia, Ethiopia and a number of other countries did not produce the
expected results. Poverty remained a problem. The promise of a rapid leap
into the "paradise of socialism" also remained an illusion.
While the USA and Western Europe and later Japan were keen on expanding
their influence in the world via investments, cultural influence and
education, the Soviet Union in order to expand its geo-political influences
concentrated on the support of "revolutionary" regimes, expending colossal
amountsof state money in the process. They maintained the point of view that
in states with poor economies progress could only be achieved via
nationalisation and centralised planning. Life, however, shows that this is
not the case.
The upshot was that in the 1970's and in particular in the 1980's the
Eastern European regimes were in the grips of a universal structural,
economic, political and spiritual crisis, both internally and externally.
Geo-politically this crisis was expressed in terms of the widening gap
between the role of the USSR as a world super power and its real economic
abilities. During the entire post-war period the military expenditure of the
USSR exceeded all permissible economic levels. Military budgets undermined
national development and seriously threatened the future of the system. On
the other hand, despite the economic crisis and evident technological
backwardness the Eastern European governments continued their policies of
universal social guarantees of employment and wages which in the 1980's in
particular lead to chronic increases in foreign debt. Consumption was
greater than production. Financial commitments to the military, price
subsidies and excessive state investments lead to the creation of enormous
budget deficits.
Essentially the system was consuming itself from within. While Western
countries were reforming and adapting to global technological problems, the
crisis in Eastern Europe was worsening. It was becoming more clear that
without radical reforms, backwardness would lead to death.
2. REFORMS AND ILLUSIONS
Attempts by the Eastern European totalitarian regimes to reformwithout
damage
to the foundations of their systems were illusory. These were merely
attempts to prolong the life of a civilisation on the wane.
T
he collapse of the Third civilisation, or if you prefer, its
"reconstruction" could have been an evolutionary process as it was in the
West, through economic reforms and the political evolution of the
totalitarian states. Since the creation of Soviet Russia in 1917 and most
notably during the last decades of its existence numerous attempts at reform
had been made. These reforms merit a general examination and can be divided
into five periods within the history of the Soviet model system.
The first of these was the period between 1917-1929 which I like to
refer to as a time of consolidation and the search for a model of
development. Notwithstanding the civil war and widespread violence the
possibility of returning to some form of democracy still remained. A certain
amount of private property, paricularly in agriculture, had been preserved.
The NEP programme (New Economic Policy) introduced by Lenin in 1921 provided
the opportunity for the use of foreign capital and private initiative.
The second stage of "pure socialism" began at the end of the 1930's
with the destruction of the remains of the NEP and a total assault on
economic, political and cultural life. The coercive formation of the
collective farms, the creation of an enormous army of labour camp slaves,
forced economic growth based on administrative and political methods and the
extermination of millions of political opponents - these were the
foundations of the Soviet Stalinist regime. During this period the Soviet
system developed as a monolithic hierarchical organisation in which the
violence of the party elite and its subordinated security organisations
dominated. From 1930 to 1953 every manifestation of private initiative and
free thought was punished with prison or death.[19]
The third period in the development of the Soviet system began with the
death of Stalin in 1953 and the "thaw" of Nikita Khrushchev. Although to
some extent contradictory, the policies implemented by Khrushchev during
this period were to leave a lasting mark on the further development of the
world. For the first time the truth about Stalin's crimes was revealed and
both Stalin himself and his system lost their authority as the proponents of
social justice and world progress.
The fourth period began in 1964 and ended at the beginning of the
1980's. It was justly named by Mikhail Gorbachev as the period of "zastoi"
(stagnation). During these years Leonid Brezhnev brought a halt to the
"thaw" begun by Khrushchev and began his attempt to immortalise the
totalitarian system through a series of internal and external cosmetic
changes. It was during this period that the USSR and its allies began to
fall behind their Western opponents in the areas of technology and
economics.
The fifth and final stage was the period of "perestroika" introduced by
Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991) which was eventually to lead to the collapse
of the Eastern European regimes and the USSR itself.
My reason for this periodisation is that from the beginning to the end
of the Soviet system there were two contradictory political trends: one of
which saw totalitarianism as the essence of the utopian communist dream and
a second which aspired to more flexible, economic and political models.
The second trend appeared directly after the February revolution of
1917 in the ideas of local self-government by workers, the implementation of
the NEP by Lenin in 1921 and 1927, the "thaw" of Khrushchev and finally in
the policy of "perestroika" of Mikhail Gorbachov. The essence of this second
trend was the combination of party and political centralism with relatively
greater freedom for the private sector (especially in trade and agriculture)
and in the area of art and culture. Its origin can be seen in the traditions
of European socialism and social democracy.
In the 1920's the proponents of a more flexible and dynamic political
line - N.Bukharin, G.Zinoviev, S.Kamenev, A.Rikov and others lost their
battle for power, allowing the party bureaucracy to dominate all structures
of society. This was the decisive moment for the development of the essence
of the Soviet model. The victory of Stalinism transformed the USSR - and a
number of other countries after the Second World War - into bureaucratic
command societies.
During the period between 1954-1956 when N.Khrushchev was fiercely
critical of the Stalinist era, he found himself in conflict with the
Stalinist system in all sectors of life. As a child of the very same system,
Khrushchev was condemning not the system but the style and leadership
methods employed by Stalin and the cult of personality. He proposed a
reevaluation of the system and mechanisms of its leadership. Khrushchev's
illusion was that by changing the leadership and functioning of the system
he would make it more effective and resolve its major problems.
During the Brezhnev period (1964-1982) a considerable number of
"improvements" were made to the leadership. The attempts made to revive the
economy by giving greater freedom to industry and a timid embracement of the
private sector clashed with the dominant principles of the totalitarian
system. There was talk of de-centralisation, collective initiative and new
economic mechanisms. However, not a word was said about the party monopoly
on power and finances, banks and the market. It would, however, have been
impossible to have freedom or private initiative without major changes to
the banking system, price liberalisation, reform to the system of investment
banking and the removal of large funds from the hands of the party and state
elite. It was quite absurd to make changes to the structures of property and
administration without changes to the principles of political power or
without profound changes to the legislative system and the guarantee of
constitutional rights and freedoms of its citizens.
History frequently provides us with examples of the combination of
heroism and illusion. Frequently the intellect of leaders and the grandeur
of their objectives have been let down by the naivety of the way in which
they attempted to achieva them. Such was the case with Stalin's opponents in
the 1920's and 30's and the policies of Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950's.
Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rikov and Bukharin paid for their naivety with their
lives since they were up against not only Stalin's will and cruelty but also
the interests and power of the party-state apparatus. Khrushchev also paid
for his own naivety and was removed from power in October 1964. For the ten
years he was in office, Khrushchev wavered between the desire to put an end
to the Stalinist repressions and the preservation of the system. The same
man who was bold enough to reveal the crimes of Stalin to the whole world
allowed cruel acts of repression against Soviet art and culture. The same
man who had the fortitude to remove the body of Stalin from the mausoleum in
Moscow became a proponent of the super-Utopian idea of the "rapid leap" into
the "paradise of communism".
The enormous belief that good could be imposed from above and that the
system could be revitalised by "the enthusiasm" and privileges of the
nomenclature, were naive. Khrushchev was no less a believer in the system of
state socialism. By throwing Stalin and Beria onto the scrapheap of history,
he deprived the Soviet people of their Divine leader and was obliged to
offer them a new Utopia - the rapid advent of communism, industrial
dominance over the USA and a high standard of living for the people of the
USSR etc.. After Krushchev's removal from power it became more difficult to
delude the people with promises of new Utopias and illusions. The myth of
the infallible leader in Stalin had been shattered. Khrushchev's programme
for entering the era of perfect communism by 1980 had failed. The next
utopia in line was Brezhnev's off-the-peg theory of a developed socialist
society.
Despite all this the logical question arises of why despite its general
instability the Soviet totalitarian system survived for such a long time -
74 years? I believe that there are a number of reasons for this.
The Soviet totalitarian model arose during a period of general crisis
and the large scale transformation of world capitalism, during a period of
globalisation and a search for various models of existence in a new
inter-dependent world. The 20th century was a time of cataclysm, change and
transition and of two world and hundreds of local wars in which more than
150 million people lost their lives. Despite its Utopian nature, the Soviet
system was a model for potential progress which emphasised absolute social
protection, guaranteed the interests of workers andpeasants and total
nationalisation as a condition for concentrating resources and directing
them towards new construction. The belief that universal social guarantees
were the basis for progress provided temporary historical justification for
the centralised type of society.
The continuing existence of the Soviet totalitarian system can be
explained with the desire and the ambitions of many nations rapidly to
overcome poverty and to avoid their possible colonisation by the larger
colonial metropolises. For many countries during the 1950's and the 1960's
the Soviet Union was a guarantee of protection against colonisation by other
countries, despite the fact that "fraternity" with the USSR meant another
type of dependence.
Was it not the case, however, that the crisis of liberalism and the
return to the ideas of nationalisation was also taking place in other parts
of the world? Practically everywhere in the world before and after the First
World War and especially at the end of the 1920's societes were undergoing
radical changes and centralisation. The victory of Hitler in Germany,
Mussolini in Italy, the Left in France and Spain was proof of this. The
crisis of world capitalism brought about by colonialism, monopolisation, the
First World War and the economic crisis of 1929-33 was sufficient motivation
and justification for the actions of Stalin as "necessary policies" in the
context of forthcoming world conflict. For millions of people the Soviet
Union was not so much a country of violent political aggression in which
millions of innocent people lost their lives but rather the power which
defeated Hitler, saved humanity from the death camps of fascism and gave a
chance to many peoples to live their lives in freedom and independence.
In 1932 in the introduction to his criticism of socialism, Ludwig von
Mizes wrote, "In Europe to the East of the Rhine there are very few
non-Marxists and even in Western Europe and the United States his (Marx)
supporters are greater in number than his opponents"[20]. If
today at the end of the 20th century, socialism is perceived as "something
bad in the past", for over half a century - from the 1920's to the 1970's it
was seen as the hope for the majority of mankind.
This is due to the not insignificant achievements of socialism in the
areas of industrialisation, science and technology, culture and art and,
most significantly, the social guarantees of labour, wages, a place to live
and so on. To disregard or to conceal these achievements would be imprudent,
and, indeed, impossible from an historical point of view. Each historical
period notwithstanding the nature of political power leaves behind it
something positive, guaranteeing the furtherance of human life. The
successes of the USSR in industrialisation, transforming it from a country
surviving on the remnants of a system of feudal agriculture into a world
super-power, guaranteed wages, work and income for the vast masses of its
population were for many people sufficient grounds for maintaining the
system.
I, therefore, do not consider the model of state socialism to be the
ravings of a group of mad politicians. Its appearance, existence and
dissemination over the whole world from the second half of the 19th century
to the end of the 20th was a consequence of huge world transformations and
reactions against the imperialist colonial world with its injustices and
wars. Despite its illusions and errors it was a conscious attempt to offer
protection to the interests of the oppressed and division and class
struggles to be replaced with unification and social unity.
I realise how difficult it is only a few years after the collapse of
the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe for these words to be uttered.
However, we should not be too hasty in our evaluation of history from the
point of view of a specific political moment in time. The continued
existence of the Soviet type of system and the popularity of the communist
idea during the greater part of the 20th century was a consequence of the
objective and global processes of transition of the modern world. It was a
part of the processes of world integration, but also a part of the crisis of
the Third Civilisation. The same factors which provided the opportunities to
state socialism also dug its grave. Continuing global integration could no
longer tolerate isolationism. Social guarantees led to the demotivation of
labour. The growth in personal and group self-confidence were limited by the
lack of basic human rights. The reason for the collapse of this system was
its tendency to consume more than it produced and to maintain "balance" via
the methodical use of aggression upon the personal freedoms of its citizens.
The very idea of achieving universal justice and material plenty via
coercion and "forced awareness" were Utopian and inhumane.
The contradictions arose from the economic essence of the system, from
the type of ownership, and not from the style and methods of leadership, as
Khrushchev considered. Khrushchev did not attempt to change the system
which, in its turn, killed him politically. His illusions were inherited
from Bukharin and in the end the system was doomed to failure. However, that
which was planted by Khrushchev, the desire for change, eventually gave
fruit. On the one hand because the reformers within the Soviet party and
state leadership were able to learn from its lessons and on the other since
they were all aware that partial and cosmetic changes would not lead to
success.
Twenty years and four months had passed since Khrushchev was removed
from office when on the 11th of March 1985 Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was
elected to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union.
3. THE TWO OPTIONS AND THE MISTAKE OF GORBACHEV
Gorbachev had two options - to change the system either by liberalising
the economy
or by changing the political system. The first option would have
guaranteed stability
and a gradual transition, the second - conflict and chaos. In any event
neither he nor his successors had a plan for global action.
A
t the beginning of 1985 the majority of the Soviet population was ready
for change. It was tired of the drawn-out death throes of the Brezhnev
leadership, filled with hope when Yuri Andropov came to power, crushed by
his death soon after that and his replacement with the aging Brezhnevite
Konstantin Chernenko. Soviet society and in particular the intelligentsia
during this period were tired of the endless speeches and demagogy, of the
discrepancies between words and reality, of the empty shelves and the
universal lack of everything which the ordinary member of the public might
require. Mikhail Gorbachev found not only fertile ground for change but he
indeed became the natural mouthpiece for the expression of all the ambitions
and hopes of the majority of Soviet society.
During his first year of office Gorbachev made significant changes to
the politburo, the government, the leadership of the armed forces and
foreign ministry. It was during this period that Edward Shevernadze came to
the fore in the Soviet leadership as foreign minister and member of the
politburo. A.Yakovlev became the leader of the propaganda section of the
Central Committee of the CPSU. Boris Yeltsin became the leader of the Moscow
party committee of the CPSU. In practice these were the three political
figures who most radically and faithfully supported the political and
economic reforms.
In 1985 Gorbachev opened up the way for improvements in Soviet and
American relations in the areas of arms control policy and the radical
reduction in first-strike nuclear weapons. The summit meeting held between
Gorbachev and the American president Ronald Reagan in November 1985 in
Geneva was the beginning of a turn-around in world nuclear arms policy. In
1986 Gorbachev accelerated personnel changes in the leadership of the
communist party and the Soviet state as well as in the mass media and local
party apparatus.
I believe that these first two years were decisive for Gorbachev's
choice of strategy. Undoubtedly, the change which he began were on a much
larger scale than those of Khrushchev and affected all areas of life.
Despite this in 1985 and 1986 Gorbachev continued to pursue the idea of
revitalising the system in the aims of "more socialism". In June 1986 in
Habarovsk he formulated the essence of "perestroika" and the need for its
advancement. During this period the people of the USSR were allowed much
greater spiritual freedom and learnt many truths about their history and the
outrages of Stalinism.
Now, looking back on the documents and facts of this period, it can be
seen that Gorbachev did not have a plan for global action. He had not
imagined that perestroika would cause such global transformations. The
General Secretary of the CPSU was motivated by the idea of strengthening
Soviet society and socialism, rather than overthrowing the culture and
system of a waning civilisation. This "provinciality" in his attitude to a
global power, such as the USSR was, is quite evident in his thousands of
speeches and articles of the time, however, it is also proof of the lack of
the global responsibility necessary for the leader of one of the two super
powers.[21]
Gorbachev had two options. The first of these was to give priority to
economic reforms (similar to Hungary and China) with simultaneous guarantees
of centralised power followed by the gradual implementation of political
reforms. The second option was to introduce political reforms followed by
economic reforms. If he had opted for the first option he would have had
further opportunities for global influence, but he did not and plunged the
USSR into a network of internal conflicts.
From the speeches made by Gorbachev between 1985 and 1986 it can be
seen that he did not underestimate economic reform and wanted to find a way
of implementing reform both in the economy and in politics. It is, however,
clear that Gorbachev and his allies were thinking on their feet and that
they did not have a clear action plan suitable for universal, global change.
The political campaigns began to take a hold but economic reforms tended to
falter in their tracks. The simultaneous implementation of economic and
political reforms in actual fact gave weight to the latter. As Gorbachev
announced the policy of Glasnost and began to reveal the truth about the
past, he put the authority of the party apparatus under threat and accepted
the enormous challenge of political reforms and the divisive inner-party
conflicts. The beginning of "perestroika" through the policy of "glasnost"
in essence meant the priority of political reform over economic reform. This
fact was of decisive significance for the fate of the USSR and Eastern
Europe and the whole world. If Gorbachev had delayed political reform and
had placed the accent on the economy, this would not have lead so rapidly to
the chaotic collapse of the Eastern European systems and the USSR. Such a
transition would not have lead to the explosion of nationalism and dozens of
local wars and conflicts. The Eastern European nations would not have become
a burden for the developed Western European nations and there would not have
been the need for billions of dollars in financial aid.
Gorbachev's choice was not the result of a deliberately thought-out
plan but rather the result of circumstances. However, having opted for a
model of change, sooner rather than later local conflicts and the collapse
of Eastern European structures were inevitable. Of the reasons for such a
denouement, one is of particular significance. The integrated nature of the
totalitarian system was totally reliant on the centralised nature of power.
In contrast to market economies where people are linked by an enormous
number of horizontal connections independent of the central power, in a
totalitarian economy social integration is maintained via central state
institutions. This applies not only to economic entities but also to ethnic
groups and the structures of information exchange and culture.
Rapid reforms to the system of political authority without economic
foundations within a totalitarian society by definition pose a risk of the
entire system collapsing in chaos. Imagine factories which are accustomed to
receiving materials allocated to them by the central planning institutions.
The destruction of this institution or change within the political or
administrative system allows the factories to sell to whom they want and to
ignore whom they want. The result of this is that at one fell swoop
thousands and millions of economic bonds are severed and the chaos becomes
unimaginable.
This was also the case in the area of international relations. Under
totalitarianism many national groups were able to co-exist peacefully within
the order imposed from above and any conflicts between them were
cosmetically concealed. However, these peoples peoples lacked sufficient
horizontal economic and cultural bonds as for example is the case with the
various nationalities inhabiting Switzerland. After the collapse of the
central power, nations which had until the previous day been good neighbours
began to divide up territories, power, money and in many cases opened up the
way for armed conflict with tanks and weapons.
Whether Gorbachev understood the scale of the emerging crisis is a
question of some doubt. What is clear, however, is that during this period
economic reforms made no progress, whereas political reforms began to give
rise to greater and greater conflicts. In January 1987, a little more than a
month after the release of Sakharov from internal exile, Mikhail Gorbachev
laid before the Central Committee of the CPSU a series of measures aimed at
political reform. These included secret ballots with multiple candidates and
the election of non-communists to senior state posts, participation of
employees in the election of directors at their place of work, the reduction
of state ownership in favour of cooperative ownership and so on. This was
not only a direct and decisive blow to the party apparatus and its vested
interests, but also to the power structure itself. After this plenum
feelings of opposition to perestroika began to make themselves felt. The
indignation of the party apparatus was total and reactions became more and
more overt. However, the inertia of change was too great to be stopped. In
1987 a process of political rehabilitation of intellectuals repressed by
Stalin began and the first timid steps were being made towards the opening
of private cooperative shops.
In the same year, which I consider the zenith of the perestroika, a
number of serious problems began to manifest themselves. Most significant of
these was the fact that "perestroika" had given practically no positive
economic results and had not alleviated the problems faced by ordinary
people. The successes which were being achieved in the medium range arms
negotiations were having less and less influence on the public opinion.
People were more concerned with the lack of goods in the shops. In October
1987 the first nationalist conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaidjan flared
up. This was the beginning of the general crisis in national relations
within the USSR. At the same time a number of diverse, but well organised,
opposition groups began to appear within the Soviet leadership. On the one
hand, both within the Central Committee of the CPSU and outside it the
opposition to Gorbachev's reforms was becoming more vocal and aimed at the
preservation of the status quo of single party power and the totalitarian
system. On the other hand, in October 1987, Boris Yeltsin made official
accusations against Gorbachev and Ligachev, marking the beginning of a
political movement aimed at more radical and liberal reforms.
From this moment on Gorbachev was obliged to strike a balance between
these two groups which limited his flexibility and making his action seems
more contradictory. The General Secretary was neither able to turn back,
which would have marked the end of his career and perestroika, nor was he
free enough to make sufficient intensive progress. Gorbachev had already
surpassed Khrushchev but was not safe from the same fate.
In November 1988, Estonia declared its independence and the right of
the Supreme Council of Estonia to veto laws passed by the Soviet parliament.
Mass independence movements began in Lithuania and Latvia. The ethnic
tension between Armenia and Azerbaidjan continued. In this situation, on the
7th of December 1988, Gorbachev announced to the UN that the Soviet army
would be reduced by half a million and the pull-out of Soviet troops from
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany began. The Soviet leader called for
a new world order. This was his biggest tactical mistake. He realised his
global responsibility too late. When Gorbachev finally understood his
decisive significance in international reform and in general, as well as the
fate of perestroika,he had already lost his power.
4. THE COLLAPSE OF PERESTROIKA
The collapse of perestroika in 1991 had been foreseen as early as the
end of 1988.
With the conflicts which ensued, it will be evaluated by modern
historians as a process filled with contradictions. On the other hand, it
opened the floodgates to new opportunities for progress and history in the
long-term will appreciate as the catalyst for the advent
of the new civilisation.
I
shall take a more detailed look at the changes which took place in
Eastern Europe not only because since I lived through them personally but
because I am convinced of the fact that the events of 1986--1991 will affect
our fate for many years to come. 1989 and 1990 were years of the gradual
"fiasco" of perestroika as a line of evolutionary change within the
totalitarian system. Its collapse took several forms. Firstly -- the
complete failure of economic reforms and, consequently, the reduced support
for perestroika on the part of the Soviet people. Secondly -- allowing the
local inter-ethnic conflicts to get out of hand and the consequent explosion
of ethnic self-confidence and demands. Thirdly -- the collapse of the
Eastern European political and military alliances and the severance of ties
between the Eastern European nations and Moscow.
As early as the beginning of January 1989 the majority of Soviet
republics began to pass a series of new laws establishing their own
languages as the official language of the republic. In March of the same
year in the first free elections for the Congress of the People's Deputies
the nationalist movements in the Baltic Republics won the absolute majority.
In May, Lithuania and Estonia and in July Latvia, in spite of Moscow's
displeasure, passed a law, declaring their independence. The question arose
of the fate of the USSR, its integrity and unity and the future of the
central leadership. This was, indeed, Gorbachev's most serious ordeal and
the precursor of the final collapse of perestroika. The opposition of the
neo-communists within the Soviet leadership was a powerful force in favour
of preserving the unity of the Soviet Union and hard-line policies.
The potential collapse of the Soviet Union was unacceptable for the
Moscow elite, mainly for ideological reasons. It is not to be underestimated
that for 70 years millions of people in the former USSR were absolutely
convinced of the need for its existence and of the idea and meaning of the
Soviet system. No less important is the fact that the collapse of the USSR
was de facto to signify the demise of all the higher leadership posts. In
1990 and 1991 such a possibility instilled feelings of insecurity in the
Soviet elite. Tens of thousands of senior civil servants, amongst them
leading figures in the Moscow government, were threatened with losing their
jobs.
There is another side to the question which has to be considered. The
majority of the world political elite considered the potential collapse of
the USSR as a complex and possibly dangerous issue. From my direct personal
conversations with senior politicians in the USA, France, Germany and
Austria and other countries and from indirect political analyses, I have the
impression that in 1990 and 1991 only the minority of them were in favour of
a collapse of the USSR. The world was concerned about the appearance of new
nuclear powers such as the Ukraine and Kazakhstan and the potential of
large-scale military conflict with the possible use of nuclear arms. The
insecurity of this super power was a matter of concern for all. This
insecurity could also be felt in Moscow. It coincided with increased
criticism of the economic and social policies of the CPSU. The leaders of
the other Eastern European states, members of the Warsaw Pact, were amongst
those who were becoming vocal in their criticism.
The most significant factor which was to sound the death knell for
perestroika was the explosion of ethnic and nationalist tension within the
USSR itself. IN January 1990, thousands of Azeris protested near to the
Soviet border with Iran. A few days later the Lithuanian communist party
ratified Lithuania's independence. On the 11th of January, Armenia exercised
its right to veto Soviet legislation, following the example of the Baltic
states. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaidjan over Nagorni Karabakh
continues to escalate. Protests and tension began to make themselves felt in
Moldova and Tadzhikistan. These were clearly not individual phenomena but
symptoms of the general collapse of the USSR.
On the 7th of February 1990, the Central Committee of the CPSU accepted
in essence the idea of a multi-party political system as the basis for the
creation of democratic socialism. In February and March during the local
government elections the established nomenclature lost many senior positions
in favour of independent and largely unknown new leaders. A little later,
V.Landsbergis was elected as the first non-communist president of a Soviet
republic. From this moment on the process of collapse began to accelerate.
Gorbachev had clearly begun to lose control of events. After 1989 the rate
of change was no longer being dictated by Gorbachev or his entourage. On the
other hand it must be appreciated that Gorbachev did not give in to the
temptations or the suggestions to halt the reform process with the help of
the army.[22]
By the middle of 1990 it was already evident that the three Baltic
republics would achieve full independence. The next great challenge came
from Kiev where the Ukraine, on the 16th February, also declared its
independence. In August another group of Soviet republics declared their
independence. Gorbachev was left the with the only alternative of proposing
a new union of independent republics. His suggestion to reorganise his
cabinet to include the leaders of all 15 republics showed that even as late
as November 1990 the central Soviet leadership was unaware of the real pace
of the reform processes and their real scale and power. In December
Kirgizia, the last remaining 15th republic declared its independence.
During the period (November--December 1990) the opposition against
Gorbachev had begun to increase and he was forced to make compromises. In
December 1990 he was forced to dismiss some of his most loyal allies and
supporters of the reform process. On the 2nd of December the Minister of the
Interior was replaced by Boris Pugo and on the 26th of December Gorbachev
put forward Genadiy Yanaev for the post of Vice-President of the Union. I do
not believe that it would be a contravention of political ethics I if were
to share my personal impressions from the meeting I had with Genadiy Yanaev
the day after he was elected to the post of the Vice-President of the USSR.
From my conversation with him it soon became clear that the election of
Yanaev was a return of those forces which desired the stabilisation of the
situation, the preservation of the USSR, more hard-line politics and a
desire to use the position of Gorbachev to achieve these aims.
In the same month, December 1990, the head of the KGB, V.Kriuchkov
began to become more vocal and to increase the authority of his position by
officially proclaiming the time-worn slogans of the danger posed by the CIA
and that the KGB was prepared to fight against any anti-communist forces. On
the other hand, one must not forget the exceptional foresight and shrewdness
of the foreign minister of the time, Edward Shevardnadze, who warned of the
imminent possibility of dictatorship. During the entire period of 1991
Gorbachev was forced to manoeuvre between these influences, hoping to
preserve the Soviet Union and to continue his line of paced reform within
the ideology of perestroika, albeit in an new form.
When I look back and analyse the events of those days, I find it
impossible not to believe that the conflict which took place at the end of
1990 was impossible for two major factors: on the one hand, the increased
rate of the disintegration of the Soviet state via the development of
democratic and completely independent movements in all the former Soviet
republics while on the other -- the threats to the interests of the ruling
elite and the increased activity of the majority of the Soviet leadership
aimed at the preservation of the status quo.
And so we arrive at the attempted coup of the 19th of August 1991. One
question begs to be answered: Did Gorbachev and other proponents of
perestroika know of the imminent coup and its scale? I do not believe so, at
least in terms of specifics. They could not have failed to have seen the
storm on the horizon or have felt the potential danger, but nothing more. On
the 16th of August A.Yakovliev warned that a coup was being prepared in
Russia, but this was more of a political conclusion than information based
on specific facts. A month later, on the 15[th] of September I
had a long conversation in Moscow with Yakovliev and Shevernadze. My
profound conviction from these talks is that they had both had a foreboding
of the events but had not believed that it could take place so quickly. I
feel that Gorbachev was of the same opinion. They had not believed for
example that the minister of defence, D. Yazov, could be involved in such a
plot. They had not believed that the entire council of ministers of the USSR
would be so willing to reject the new Treaty of Union to replace to the USSR
with a Confederation of Independent States. Of course, there were many
inexplicable occurrences during the course of the attempted coup, but that
is the way of politics. Large-scale change is often connected with many
inexplicable events when the momentary psychological or physical conditions
of an individual or group of individuals can be of decisive significance for
events.
The intention of the leaders of the coup was to carry replace Gorbachev
quietly, or at least to put him out of the way in reserve. Yanaev,
Kriuchkov, Pavlov[23] and others had evidently been in favour of
the maximum flexibility in the change of power with the eventual gradual
restoration of the Soviet regime. Gorbachev had to be convinced to withdraw
for reasons of illness or nervous exhaustion or to come into line with the
leaders of the coup and to "cure" himself of his illusions. There were clear
analogies with the coup of August 1991 and the removal of Khrushchev from
power in October 1964 -- a statement regarding the illness of the leader,
putting the troops on alert along with a declaration that they would not be
used as an elementary attempted to pacify the people and international
society.
There were, however, enormous differences between 1991 and 1964.
Underestimating these differences was one of the biggest mistakes the
leaders of the coup made. In August 1991 the Russian nation and in
particular the Russian intelligentsia were of a completely different state
of mind. Their thirst for and their experiences of freedom were stronger
than any more primitive feelings for preserving the status quo.
Notwithstanding economic difficulties, masses of the Soviet people had
experienced the taste of free life. Although perestroika in terms of
strategy and tactics was already bankrupt, it had lead to profound changes
in the way of thinking of wide ranging social groups. The 19th of August was
the litmus test which in reality showed what had been achieved by Gorbachev.
Perestroika had not only unleashed the will of the people but had also given
it the self-confidence not to heed what was said to them "from above".
Shortly after the attempted coup the rock group, "The Scorpions"
released their hit "The Winds of Change", dedicated to those who had
thwarted the coup. Indeed, this wind came from the heart of the reformed
Soviet society, from the new spirit cultivated by perestroika.
On the day after the coup, on the 20th of August, several hundred
thousand demonstrators protested against it in St.Petersburg, thousands
surrounded the White House. Huge demonstrations were organised in the larger
towns of Russia. Major sections of the Russian army refused to carry out the
orders of leaders of the coup or take any decisive actions. On the evening
of the 20th of August it was already becoming apparent that the
self-proclaimed "Committee of salvation" had lost control over the
situation. At that moment the leaders of the coup had two choices: either to
declare a bloody civil war with no predictable outcome or to sound the
retreat.
In the final outcome, the coup was thwarted by the decisive actions of
Boris Yeltsin and his supporters, but also by the millions of ordinary
Russian people who were unwilling to make compromises with their
consciences, the generals and officers whose thoughts and deeds were not
limited by party interests and remained loyal to their exalted mission. I
will never forget my telephone conversation at that time with Edward
Shevernadze. At the time of the conversation the outcome of the conflict was
far from clear. Despite this I felt in him not only his decisiveness to
engage in the struggle, but also a clear feeling of responsibility to avoid
the unthinkable -- to avoid a civil war or a large-scale thermo-nuclear war.
I feel tempted to write that not only in the USSR but in other countries as
well the driving forces of change were the standard bearers of the emergent
new civilisation. Many of them, perhaps still unconsciously, other, thinking
with the criteria of world progress, and yet others since they had just had
enough of thinking the way other people wanted them to think.
The 19th of August 1991 was the real date of the end of perestroika and
the start of new beginnings in the process of economic and political reforms
in the USSR. The collapse of the coup meant, in practice, the collapse of
the major forces which were holding up the reform process. It meant
something else as well: together with the ban on the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union and the dismissal of the Council of Ministers, the arrest of
the conspirators the main it resulted in the removal of the main
institutions of power which until that moment had held the USSR together.
Making the most of this moment, in the days following the failed coup, the
former Soviet republics confirmed their announcements of independence. The
new union treaty of which the leaders of the coup had been so frightened and
which would have saved the Union was forgotten. The new directly elected
president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, began a series of direct contacts with
the leaders of the former Soviet republics and with only a few months
withdrew the prerogatives of the centralised Soviet ministries. This in
reality meant the collapse of the USSR and the passing of its basic rights
and obligations into the domain of the Russian republic.
After coming to terms with the huge public support for the actions of
Boris Yeltsin, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned in 1991.[24] This was
the end of a significant period in the history of the nations of the former
USSR. As paradoxical as it may seem, this period also marked the beginning
of a new era in the development of the world. The collapse of one of the two
superpowers meant in practice the collapse of the bi-polar world and
together with this the structures which were typical of the Third
Civilisation.
5. THE EXPLOSION IN EASTERN EUROPE
The radical changes within Eastern Europe during the period between
1989 and 1990 were the first part of the universal political restructuring
of the world order.
These changes began as a huge emotional outpouring soon to be followed
by enormous problems and disappointments.
A
number of experts on the subject believe that the changes in the
Eastern Europe were the result of understandings reached by Gorbachev and
Reagan at their numerous meetings, in particular in Malta. My personal
opinion is that these processes could not have come about as the result of
any agreement. The changes were a result of the growth in self-confidence of
the Eastern European peoples as a consequence of perestroika, of the
confidence in the influence of the democratic movements and the feeling that
Gorbachev and his entourage were losing control over power.
The extent of the influence of the reforms which took place in the USSR
after 1985 on the countries in Eastern Europe was enormous. In Bulgaria, for
example, whose language is very close to Russian, the most popular
newspapers between 1986 and 1989 were not Bulgarian but Soviet. The spirit
of perestroika, the revelations of truths about the past, the constant
reminders that the Utopias of the totalitarian regimes were bankrupt lead to
enormous changes in people's attitudes and prepared the way for the
beginning of the explosion. Despite differences in scale and methods, all
the "socialist" countries of Eastern Europe began to give birth to new civil
movements and the growth in free expression and the desire for profound
reforms.
On the 6th of March 1989 the speaker of the Soviet foreign ministry,
Gerasimov, announced that the future of every Eastern European country lay
in its own hands. In this way he officially dismissed the Brezhnev doctrine
which guaranteed the control of Moscow over all its Eastern European
satellites. There is no doubt that Gorbachev had given prior notice of this
announcement to his Western partners. From this moment on, events unfolded
at an unbelievable pace.
In May 1989 the Hungarian government dominated by reformist communists
opened its border with Austria and allowed thousands of citizens from the
former German Democratic Republic to travel to West Germany. A little later
the Polish trade union "Solidarity" achieved a decisive victory in the
elections to the Senate and part of the lower chamber of the Polish Sejm.
Moscow accepted these events calmly, thus proving that it had indeed
accepted a new policy towards Eastern Europe. On the 7th of July at a summit
meeting of the Warsaw pact countries in Bucharest, Gorbachev declared that
all the members of the pact were at liberty to chose their own paths.
What was the objective of the Soviet leadership in relation to its
former allies?
Analysing the experience of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and a
number of other Eastern European countries of this period, I believe that
between the spring and summer of 1989 Gorbachev had begun to apply a policy
based on two main theses: first of all -- the rejection of the "Brezhnev
doctrine" on the limitation of sovereignty and allowing greater freedom to
the governments of the relevant countries; secondly -- the replacement of
the old leaderships with new, more pragmatic leaders and the preservation of
the Soviet zone of influence on the basis on new alliances and treaties.
This, however, involved the same theoretical and practical problem as in the
Soviet Union. On the one hand, Gorbachev wanted to give greater freedom and
to support the reform processes within the Eastern European communist
parties. On the other hand, he could or would not comprehend the scale of
the explosion, the fuse of which he had lighted himself. The reform
processes resembled an uncorked bottle of champagne rather than a
well-thought out scheme. After liberation of their spirits, the people would
no longer accept leaders imposed upon them from above and pouring out onto
the streets and squares they demonstrated new power and self-confidence.
After the summit meeting in Bucharest in July 1989 events unfolded like
a chain reaction. On the 7th of October Gorbachev directly influenced the
beginning of reforms in the DDR and on the 18th of October Erik Honneker was
replaced by Egon Krenz. A few days later the Berlin wall came down. On the
10th of November the Bulgarian communist leader, Todor Zhivkov, was replaced
by Petar Mladenov, who was favoured by the Soviet leadership. At the end of
November and the beginning of December after mass unrest in Prague, a new
government was formed consisting mainly of non-communists and on the 29th of
December Vaclav Havel became the first non-communist president from more
that 40 years. During the last few days of December the Rumanian dictator
and his wife were killed after a military coup and a hastily improvised
trial.
From the point of view of the history of the Eastern European nations
these changes had enormous significance. They followed the logic of the
analogous changes which were taking place within the USSR, but rapidly
overtook them in terms of their speed and depth. Apart from the universal
elements of the crisis within the USSR there were the additional factors of
the struggle and aspirations of the smaller Eastern European nations for
complete sovereignty and independence. This also helps to explain the more
radical nature of the changes which took place within them.
From a global point of view the explosion in Eastern Europe was the
first phase of the larger geo-political changes and the creation of a new
world order. The changes in Moscow, Berlin, Sofia, Prague, Budapest and
Bucharest, together with the collapse of the USSR can be determined as the
beginning of the collapse of the Third Civilisation. The military and
political alliances of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON were rendered pointless.
The political map of Europe had changed beyond recognition.
The democratic changes in Eastern Europe could have taken place in a
different way but they could not have been avoided. The changes were a
consequence of the crisis of the totalitarian regimes, their inability to
adapt to the large technological and political changes in the world and the
requirements of the new age. The administrative coercion of the one-party
system and the repression of private economic initiative were shown to be
historical mistakes.
Only history will decide what would have been best for the world --
either the "Chinese" model of reform by placing priority on economic reform,
or the "velvet revolutions" which in reality took place. I have to say
personally, that not only in Bulgaria but in most of the other Eastern
European countries very few people believed in the rapid demise of the USSR
before 1989. No-one could believe that a super power such as the USSR could
allow itself to reject its global privileges or that the leader of such a
super power would voluntarily "concede" his "conquests" without wanting
anything in return.
And now, looking back to the facts of 5--6 years ago, I can see for
myself yet again, that the changes in Eastern Europe were not thought out
beforehand, not were they carried out effectively from a regional or global
point of view. The West was carried away with the "ideological" ecstasy that
communism was on its way out. In the Eastern European countries themselves
the nature of the changes was motivated mainly by internal conflicts and
clashes. In some Eastern European countries restorationalists got the upper
hand, with aspirations to restore to themselves the pre-war rights they had
lost. Radical change from strong state regulation to radical liberalism had
its destructive consequences. It was clear that in this way the Eastern
European countries would undergo a long period of instability and a slow
adaptation to the European Community.
From a positive point of view, the most important consequences of the
changes in Eastern Europe were the destruction of internal obstructions to
world integration and the creation of the new structures of the global
world. At the same time the discovery of new virgin territory for world
globalisation was far from promising world harmony. Realisation was soon to
come in the West that the belief in the final victory of world capitalism
was wrong. In the East internal conflicts continued. New solutions had to be
found while the common crisis persisted...
6. RETURN TO A DIFFICULT FUTURE
Was the return to power of the former Eastern European socialist
parties a logical
stage in development? There is a common reason for this. It was a
confirmation
of the thesis that the political process is not a series of
happenstances but is rather
governed by a definite logical process.
A
fter the series of mainly "gentle" revolutions in Eastern Europe in
1989 and 1990 and the changes which took place later in the USSR, the period
between 1993 and 1995 was marked by a series of elections in which the
former communist parties (or their political successors) were returned to
power. In Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia the former
communists won categorical victories at the polls. In December this was
repeated in Russia by the communist party lead by G.Zuganov. In Rumania and
Yugoslavia the former communists never actually left power. This gave rise
to the question which is not uppermost in the minds of modern thinkers and
politicians: was this return to power of the ex-communist parties a logical
stage in development?
I have to admit that during the five or six years of the reform process
many of these parties did undergo profound changes. They accepted the values
of democracy and pluralism and changed their platforms. In contrast to the
newly-formed parties of anti-communists, democrats and liberals they had
well organised party structures and people faithful to them in all sectors
of economic power. Some of these parties together with the structures of the
former state security organisations had been preparing themselves for
pluralism and opposition politics as early as the period of perestroika.
Economic domination, the creation of their own "loyal" dissident and
political circles, the infiltration of trusted members into the newly-formed
anti-communist parties - all this was undoubtedly well planned and had a
strong influence on the political situation.
The most important reason for the return of the ex-communist parties to
power, in my opinion, can be found in the nature of the totalitarian system
and the logical stages in its change. What I referred to earlier as the
"mistake" of Gorbachev was also decisive here. The new democratic, radical
and liberal forces came to the forefront riding high on the wave of
political reform. E.Gaidar and A.Chubais in Russia, L.Balzerovic in Polish
and Y.Antal in Hungary all became symbols of the reform. All the reformers,
however, were faced with the same problem - while political changes could be
carried out radically and quickly, economic reform required time, trained
specialists and techniques specifically designed for the transition from
extreme centralism to a market economy. The "phased" discrepancies between
economic and political changes caused economic difficulties, serious
political clashes and crime.
The explosion of emotions and anti-communism of the autumn of 1989 and
during the period between 1990-1991 succeeded in alienating the former
administrative and economic elite from the new democrats. Their more or less
forced removal from ministries and state factories provided them with
significant opportunities in the private sector where they acted in close
cooperation with tens of thousands of well-trained experts from the former
state security organisations. The only way for the new democratic forces to
control the economic forces was to get them on their side, as happened in
the Czech republic. Elsewhere where pragmatism was replaced with virulent
anti-communism, the new political forces were unable to control the economic
sector sufficiently to carry out large-scale reforms. The economic forces,
banks, factories and the private sector, in general remained in the hands of
people trained by the former totalitarian regime.
The second important reason was the disappointment of the population.
One group of the population had benefitted from a series of social
privileges and guarantees under the totalitarian regime. By supporting the
reforms between 1989 and 1990 many of these people expected a rapid solution
to the problems which they were experiencing and not the chaos, crime and
fall in living standards and production which in reality ensued.
Unfortunately, as a result of the delays in economic reform during the
period of perestroika and the clashes with the harsh reality of the open
world economy these hopes remain unfulfilled. Bulgaria did not become a
Balkan Switzerland, as some of its leaders promised, nor did Rumania become
France. Quite the contrary, the populations of the Eastern European
countries had to come to terms with the unwelcome news that they produced
little, consumed much more and had to reverse this ratio by 180 percent.
For these reasons in 1992 almost all the Eastern European countries
experienced a profound change in social attitudes. The political elite who
had been in power from 1989-1990 were forced to realise in terror that their
sleepless nights, the titanic struggle and reforms were now considered by
many as mistaken. Of course, it should be added that many of the new
democrats did in fact make many mistakes. In the long run the radical nature
of the economic reforms in the period between 1989 and 1990 and the delay in
implementing economic reforms led to the political equilibrium being upset.
Sooner or later it had to be restored. A significant percentage of the
population in Eastern Europe had become impoverished and disappointed. They
preferred to vote for the former communist parties seeing in them hope for
the restoration of the social benefits which they had lost.
However, can the reformed communists live up to these expectations? The
answer is a conditional "no", or a partial "no". The condition is that they
undertake a flexible policy of reform aimed at the widest possible social
strata of society. Due to the legislative changes which have been
undertaken, any return to the past is unlikely, although to a certain extent
still possible, mainly in Russia. There still remains the difficult path of
peaceful reforms needed to achieve successful economic policies. For this
reason the return of the ex-communist parties is a return to a difficult
future. It will not halt the global processes of integration, nor will it
delay the processes of moving towards new, civilising social relations.
After the battle of Waterloo at the beginning of the 19th century, the
processes of restoration in France looked inexorable and many believed in
it. However, it was to be seen that once the seeds of revolutionary ideas
had been sown, it was to be very difficult to destroy them, the freedoms
that had been won could not be taken away. Such is the case with the return
of the ex-communist parties to power. They will either have to adapt to the
new civilising realities or they will thrown onto the scrapheap of history.
For the ex-communist parties of Hungary and Poland this will be easier,
their ideological reformation began a long time before they came back to
power. For the Bulgarian Socialist Party or the Party of Social Democracy in
Rumania this will be more difficult.
Whatever the outcome, the reflected processes of global transition in
Eastern Europe will not be smooth. As a reaction to the errors and the
collapse of perestroika politics went too far to the right and then turned
sharply to the left. The realities of life will put the former socialist
parties to the test. Some of them will rise to the challenge and some will
fall victim to the contradiction of their own ideological contradictions,
while still others will collapse under the pressure of vested interests.
Whether the New Civilisation will accept them is a matter that the future
will show us.
Chapter Three
COLLAPSE II: GLOBAL DISORDER
1. THE DANGER OF CHAOS
Ever change of epoch takes place in the context of conflict and
disorder.
The crisis in the East is just the first phase of the changes in the
present global political order. The second phase will take place in the West
and Far East...
T
he universal processes of globalisation and the collapse of the Eastern
European regimes have given rise to a whole series of unfamiliar phenomena.
Humanity has entered a new phase of development marked by the huge and
growing level of mutual interdependence between people, nations and
cultures. The global order based on the principles of bi-polarism of two
super powers and which had dominated since the Second World War has been
destroyed. To a large extent the way in which the Eastern European regimes
collapsed lead to this state of chaos firstly in their own countries and
later in international economic and political relations. I define chaos as a
universal crisis of the spiritual and value systems, the rejection of
certain standards of global intercourse and the instability of others, as a
period of relative disorder leading to change in the world order.
The first phase of this chaos began in 1989--1900 with the collapse of
the Eastern European regimes and the economic and military organisations in
this part of the world. The dissolution of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact in
the space of a few months led to chaos in economic relations within Eastern
Europe. The mutual export of goods between the former members of these
organisations fell sharply. Almost all the countries in the region lost
their markets and the stability of their industrial structures was all but
destroyed. Later this was followed by the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia. A number of ethnic conflicts flared up, some of
which developed into full-scale wars. For the three years between 1990--1993
the region was in absolute chaos.
I believe that this first stage will be followed by a second, very
important stage of changes. This second stage, which has already begun is
affecting the larger Western powers and their mutual relations, with new
roles and positions being assumed by the Asian states and the acceptance of
new principles in international economic and cultural relations and with
formation of new institutions for the regulations of global processes etc..
Some of them will want to preserve the status quo and their position of
dominance, while others will want to prove old theories. However, there is
only one truth: the post-war global order has lost a number of its main
foundations. Humanity has entered a transitionary period from the bi-polar
model to a new, unfamiliar global structure. The universal crisis of the
post-war political model had caused and continues to cause the general
collapse of contacts and relations wwhich will be of great significance for
further development.
There are two interrelated factors which are of influence on the
processes which are taking place: globalisation as a fundamental and
continuous phenomenon and the crisis in Eastern Europe which was provoked by
globalisation and which at the same time has accelerated its pace. The
problem, however, is that no-one, or almost no-one was prepared for what
happened - neither the collapse of the iron curtain, nor the consequences of
the new drive towards globalisation and its side effects.
I want to speak of the dangers posed by chaos and general disorder
mainly because after the collapse of the Eastern European regimes not one of
the factors which caused the universal crisis of contemporary civilisation
has dissappeared entirely.The deformations of economic growth remain and
global ecological problems have yet to be solved. After the renewal of
nuclear tests, albeit tactical, by France in September 1995 no-one any
longer believes that disarmament is irreversible.
In the context of the bi-polar model the world was governed by two
super powers and a group of nations dependent on them. Today the level of
direct government has sharply declined. After the collapse of the USSR a
number of new pretenders to world leadership have appeared and before our
very eyes the roles and relations of former allies have changed radically.
Politics is no longer two-dimensional but an equation with hundreds of
unknowns. A clear example of the ontradictions between the great powers can
be seen in the war in the former Yugoslavia. The vested interests of certain
states, in assisting various leaders and arming different armies demonstrate
that the old political tradition, the tradition of the bi-polar world has
long since passed away.
Or let us take Europe. The unification of the two Germanies did not
only impose a series of new responsibilities on West Germany but has created
complex problems for pan-European processes. Germany transferred part of the
burden of unification on to its European partners via the mechanisms of
international financial relations. The integration of the two German states
has changed the structure of Europe and the relations of the states within
it. The granting ofassociate membership status to the Eastern European
countries within the structures of the EU seemed in 1989-1991 a relatively
easy task but was soon delayed almost indefinitely. This was to a certain
extent because of the unwillingness of Russia to allow itself to be
encircled by a new "iron" or other type of curtain. The place and role of
Russia itself in the global community are still unclear.
In the global aspect the collapse of the Eastern European regimes has
had even greater consequences. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its
economic potential to all intents and purposes removed one of the two main
super powers from the geo-political map. Only the USA remains. A number of
years have passed and there are already voices which proclaim that the super
powers are no longer necessary. France has offered to extend its nuclear
umbrella over Germany. Germany and Japan have demonstrated their desires to
become permanent members of the Security Council.Russia has officially
requested membership of the group of the most developed nations.
The collapse of the Eastern European economic and political structures
has opened up a hole in world economic relations with consequences for the
world economic order. A not insignificant number of investments have flowed
into Eastern Europe. West Germany's great commitments to its new Eastern
provinces have resulted in a deterioration in the condition of the European
exchange rate system. Without the burdens of such problems, Japan and a
number of other countries in the Far East have continued to develop their
potential and to exert more and more influence on the world economic
processes. China has demonstrated high levels of growth and a flourishing
economy. The changes in South Africa and the forthcoming transition in Hong
Kong have encouraged high levels of investment and movement of funds.
In 1992 and 1993 while delivering lectures in Switzerland and the USA I
emphasised on several occasions that geo-political turbulence will affect
the world financial systems. Even today few people really believe in this
although the facts are there for all to see. In the winter and spring of
1995 the American dollar began to tumble against the Japanese yen. The world
financial markets became very worried and the most prominent financial
experts explained it away with the American budget deficit, the crisis of
the Mexican peso or ambitions to increase American export. What really
happened demonstrates the reduced abilities of governments and central banks
to exercise effective control over international economic relations. Certain
"invisible" private forces are already in control of the world economy and
are rarely affected by governmental influence.
Moreover, the first symptoms of uncotrollability appeared directly
after the collapse of the Brenton Woods system at the beginning of the
1970's when in March 1973 Richard Nixon allowed the dollar to float. For
almost a quarter of a century the dollar has been trying to find its levels
via floating exchange rates and now we are on the eve of a new governmental
vacuum. The reason for this is the constant increase in the role of the
private banks and unidentified financial funds in global economics, the
growth in the role of centrifugal effects in the world financial systems. In
the spring of 1995 the director of the International Monetary Fund,
M.Cammedessu, declared that in the near future and with its present
structures the IMF would not be able to continue to fulfil its functions.
"We are living in a dangerous world" were the words of Cammedessu. His
trepidations were emphasised by the constant growth in unregulated funds of
money as well as by the growing mountain of state and private debts etc..
Neither the present international financial system nor the entire world
economic and political order will be able to prevent any possible crises.
The chaos has affected the spiritual relations, thinking and value
systems of people. The world communist movement underwent a catastrophe with
negative repercussion for a number of other socialist and social democratic
movements. On the other hand, the unpreparedness of the West to act quickly
and the clear inadequacy of liberal doctrines to stop the crisis showed that
they are unable to offer a miracle treatment. Many politicians in attempts
to avoid divergence between reality and ideas have stated that it is no
longer political programmes or ideologies which are important but pragmatic
action. As in other similar historical transitional periods a large number
of people are confused and prefer to take refuge in local pragmatism and
finding solutions only to current problems. The lack of a common view about
how one should approach the new situation has opened the door to
nationalism, ethnic ambitions and xenophobia. A significant number of world
politicians have been compelled to turn their attention to current problem
solving and to ignore global and regional problems. It is becoming more and
more evident that there is a need for a global analysis on what is taking
place, its consequences and a search for a solution to the chaos which is
ensuing. Today there is no doctrine or common theory about the future of the
world, or how to solve our common problems: the global economic order, the
environment, poverty, religious tolerance, stabilisation of growth etc..
This is one of the reasons why nationalism often comes to the fore in the
search for solutions to global problems.
The attitudes of the younger generations is a very important indication
of the spiritual crisis. I often speak to my colleagues who are lecturers in
various institutions of higher education in the industrialised countries of
the world. In the less developed countries the situation is less clear. The
young people in these countries want to achieve the material prosperity of
the richest nations which is in itself strong motivation. In the USA, Japan,
France, Great Britain, Canada and Germany, however, for quite a long time
now, students and young people have no overall idea about their future. The
ambition of achieving a certain level of material prosperity, a large bank
account, one's own business, to travel abroad and so on, are largely
manifestations of tradition rather than anything else.
But what does this mean? Healthy interests and the stability of the
system? Or, rather, a spiritual crisis in a vacuum expressed by the new
generations in the most developed countries drowning in luxury and spiritual
consumerism.
World history has witnessed other periods of chaos and disorder of
global structures: some longer some shorter. The problem is that the changes
which are taking place today are not as the result of wars in which the
victor imposes his will with force. The globalisation of the world has led
to a universal crisis of the current world order. This is a crisis of the
entire world system, of national and regional thinking and consequently
everything else which typifies the Third Civilisation. Within global
relations there is a new spiritual, economic and political vacuum. If these
vacuums are not filled with adequate changes to world structures, there may
be indescribable consequences. Why has there been such an explosion of
religious sects in recent years? Why has terrorism become a global problem
and is more and more uncompromising and violent in its forms? Why are people
becoming more alienated from politics? Why has fundamentalism spread into
new territories? Why has international crime grown so much?
The reason is that the current world order is not adequate to respond
to the new realities. NATO and the USA alone are not capable of resolving
world conflicts. This may even lead to a reaction from Russia or China and
new divisions within the world. The UN does not have the strength to stop
conflicts. It is becoming apparent that many elements of the current world
system are outdated and its major mechanisms have to be changed and
repaired.
The manifold lack of clarity in international political and economic
relations are an expression of an inadequately low level of agreement
between countries and the expectation that everything will resolve itself.
The disorder is on such a large scale that it requires common action on the
basis of universally accepted principles. Of course, the world today is much
more integrated. This should not be seen so much as an advantage but as a
condition for overcoming the chaos more rapidly and for allowing integration
to develop. This will also require some form of world coordination, of
mutually acceptable decisions and the growth in the role of organisations
such as the UN. It would, however, be imprudent to suppose that the problems
with which we are faced will be resolved quickly and conclusively. This will
require a relatively longer period. The new world order will develop
gradually, based on mutually agreeable action .This conclusion is based on
the fact that the real world powers are still acting from their position as
nation states and their national responsibilities and will only change the
international rules of the game within that context. This is logical but it
also carries a risk. Given a variety of events and varying conditions any
one country with a more dominant global role by changing its internal order
runs the risk of causing a universal cataclysm.
Globalisation and its progeny - the global world, will lead to a crisis
not only of traditional international relations but also of the political
systems of national societies. The interests of more and more people stretch
beyond the bounds of a single state and depend less and less on the
decisions of a single government. Everywhere in the developed world there is
a decline in trust for traditional political systems and a need for new
decisions. Thus:
1. The lack of a mechanism for reliable international, economic and
political regulations;
2. The contradiction between the unlimited global power of world
corporations and the limited power of governmental decisions;
3. The reactions of 2.5-3 billion poor people in the unification of
humanity into a single mutually dependent whole;
4. The danger of new nationalism and the restoration the division of
the world into blocs;
5. The possibility of the bi-polar model being exchanged for a
mono-centric world structure and the domination of one or a group of rich
states;
6. The destruction of small cultures and the dilution of national
traditions and values;
7. The limitation of the private life of the individual and his
transformation into a "manipulated animal" by the new media;
8. The crisis of traditional political systems;
9. Terrorism and international crime;
All this factors are expressions of the disorder and danger of chaos -
an expression of the crisis of the borders between the two epochs.
2. GEOPOLITICAL COLLAPSE
One of the most important consequences of the collapse of the Eastern
European
totalitarian regimes was the change in geo-political structures. The
bi-polar
world seems to have collapsed irreversibly.
T
he "modern" age which has occupied the last five centuries in the
development of humanity has been a time of the creation and consolidation of
nation states, of the formation of alliances and opposing political blocs.
After the collapse of the Berlin wall a series of global processes began
which were to lead to gradual but irreversible changes in the world
political order. Directly after the fall of the"totalitarian regimes in
Eastern Europe the majority of political commentators and researchers
considered that the problem would be limited to the collapse of the USSR and
a number of smaller Eastern European states and thereafter their inclusion
in the structures of the developed nations of NATO and the EU. Such
one-sided views continue to predominate today, despite the fact that most
people are aware of their inadequacies. The problem is that after the
explosion in Eastern Europe a slow but unstoppable process of universal
geopolitical change began. I refer to this process as "geo-political
collapse", since it affected the political structures typical of the entire
twentieth century and in a broader context, the entire Third Civilisation.
What is clear is that the map of Europe is being reshaped. However, let
us look at the rest of the world. Despite the strong influence of Russia in
Central Asia there is a growing conflict of interests between a number of
Islamic states and China. The unification of Germany has changed the
proportionality of power in central Europe. There is no need for detailed
forecasts in this area although there are certain clear trends emerging
which seem to herald the end of the old world order.
The first wave of the geo-political collapse clearly took place in
Eastern Europe and most significantly in the USSR. The second will be
connected with the increase in the political importance of Europe (above all
Germany) and Japan. he role of the USA, the only remaining super power, will
be to provide a balance with all the consequences which that entails. The
third wave will be a consequence of the increase in the economic and the
political importance of a number of smaller countries in South Eastern
Europe, Asia and Latin America.
At the beginning of the 1990's we were witnesses not only to the
collapse of the Eastern European political structures but also to the
potential of profound changes within the West. There is no doubt that the
borders of the European community will move towards the East and that the
role of Germany in this process will be extremely significant.
The consolidation of the European Union and the creation of a single
European currency which appears to have strong political
support[25] presuppose a number of changes in trans-Atlantic
cooperation. I do not believe that trans-Atlantic ties will weaken but I do
believe that the creation of a common European currency will bring about
many changes in their nature, scale and direction.
It is true that a large number of lesser developed states still do not
have the self-confidence and strength to undertake independent activities.
Even if this were to happen, such ideas would develop in isolation rather
than as a part of a logical process. For the moment the countries outside
the Group of 25 are strongly dependent on the most developed nations.
Amongst them, however, there are a number of nations with growing ambitions
for more economic and political influence. Which will be stronger?
Integration or an eruption of ambitions and the struggle for new influence?
The question is whether the struggle for free economic and political
relations will begin in Asia, Africa or Latin America? Will this not be
stronger than the processes of global integration?
In any event one thing is clear - the old world order created between
the 18th and 19th centuries by a group of advanced European states and the
two super powers which emerged in the 20th century is now a thing of the
past. The old geo-political world is collapsing before our eyes and not only
as a consequence of the collapse of the USSR. In the autumn of 1995 the
voters in Quebec very nearly voted for secession from Canada which could
have lead to the real collapse of the Canadian state. Almost daily,
politicians and civil servants in the European capital of Brussels reiterate
the view that the USA should no longer play the role of a super power. In
Paris the views are even more categorical. The state of chaos is due to the
fact that the world is undergoing transition. There are many processes and
situations within this transition as well as many unpredictable deviations.
3. ECONOMIC TURBULENCE
Colossal disproportions have accumulated within the financial systems
of the world. Until now they have not lead to any great crises because of
the regulatory role played by the world political order. However, after its
total collapse are we not bound to feel the cold embrace of instability and
chaos?
O
n the 1st of September 1995 the world news agencies reported an
emerging financial crisis in the most prosperous of post-war economies -
Japan. Thousands of investors withdrew their deposits from the Kisu Credit
Union in Osaka and the Hiogo bank in Kobe which were then closed to all
kinds of banking operations. Their clients wanted to withdraw over 3 billion
US dollars or almost 1/4 of the total deposits of the union. The
bankruptcies of a number of Japanese credit unions and the unprecedented
problems they caused for a number of large banks cast huge doubts about the
stability of the banking system in Japan. The reason for such shocks is the
huge amount of debt accumulated in the 1980's when stock exchange prices
were very high and suddenly fell as a result of the global recession.
The problem, however, is more complex. More and more people are
becoming aware of the fact that the debts accumulated by governments and
individual financial structures will not be repaid. The enormous debt of the
American government and the increased indebtedness of other developed
countries pose a question about the efficacy of the world financial system.
It is true that in contrast to the Great Depression of the 1939, the banks
and national governments now have much greater reserves and experience in
avoiding financial crises. However, it is also true that such colossal debts
are possible in the conditions of guaranteed political economic regulation
and a clear and stable political order. The trust in the major currencies is
based not only on their real condition but on their established monopoly of
the world markets.
It is not difficult to comprehend that if the geo-political
restructuring does take place then political and military factors will lose
their influence and the problem with debt will prove catastrophic. There is
a direct link between the changes in world political structures and
stability of the existing financial systems. Neither of them are adequate
for the conditions of the epoch which we are now entering.
Of course, the world economy will